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An RSA modulus is a product M ¼ pl of two primes p and l. We show that for
almost all RSA moduli M, the number of sparse exponents e (which allow for fast
RSA encryption) with the property that gcdðe;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1 (hence RSA decryption
can also be performed) is very close to the expected value. # 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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Let M be an integer, and let jðMÞ denote the Euler function.
We recall that given an integer e with gcdðe;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1, one round of
RSA encryption of a message x 2 ½0;M  1 consists of the modular
exponentiation xe  y ðmod MÞ, which produces an encrypted message
y 2 ½0;M  1. Because gcdðe;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1, if the factorization of M is
known (hence the value of jðMÞ can be computed), one can ﬁnd an integer
d with
ed  1 ðmod jðMÞÞ: ð1Þ
The decryption then consists of the modular exponentiation
yd  xed  x ðmod MÞ:
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NUMBER OF SPARSE RSA EXPONENTS 341In this paper, we estimate the number of sparse exponents e, which support
fast modular exponentiation xe ðmod MÞ and therefore speed-up RSA
encryption, that also satisfy the condition gcdðe;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1.
It is often recommended to select the encryption (or decryption) exponent
in the RSA algorithm as a sparse integer (with say at most k non-zero binary
digits); see [12, Sect. 14.6.1]. If e is an n-bit integer with only k non-zero
binary digits, then the computation of xe ðmod MÞ by repeated squaring
requires n þ k modular multiplications, while for an arbitrary n-bit integer it
is about 2n operations in the worst case and about 1:5n operations ‘‘on
average’’. However, since we also require the condition gcdðe;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1
for decryption, it is not clear how many such exponents are available. We
remark that despite the existence of faster exponentiation methods, repeated
squaring still remains one of the most commonly used in practice. In any
case, studying the properties of sparse integers is a very natural number
theoretic question.
To be more precise, let us denote byNn;kðMÞ the set of e 2 ½1; 2n  1 with
exactly k non-zero binary digits and such that gcdðe;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1. We will
show that the cardinality Nn;kðMÞ ofNn;kðMÞ is close to its expected value
Nn;kðMÞ 
 2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ ;
when M runs through the set of RSA moduli M ¼ pl, where p and l are two
prime numbers. We remark that for an even m there are jðmÞ integers
x 2 ½0;m=2 1 for which gcdð2x þ 1;mÞ ¼ 1, thus the density of such x 2
½0;m=2 1 is equal to 2jðmÞ=m.
Throughout the paper, P denotes the set of primes; log z and ln z denote
the binary and natural logarithms of z > 0, respectively.
2. COUNTING SPARSE ENCRYPTION EXPONENTS
For an integer n, we denote by Rn, the set of n-bit integers that are
products of two primes, that is,
Rn ¼ fM ¼ pl : 2n14M52n; p; l 2 Pg:
Let us consider the sum
WkðnÞ ¼ 1jRnj
X
M2Rn
Nn;kðMÞ  2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ

:
BANKS AND SHPARLINSKI342Theorem. For any k and n with k4ðn þ 1Þ=2, the bound
WkðnÞ ¼ O kn3
n  1
k  1
 !
expðck3=2n1Þ
 !
holds for some absolute constant c > 0.
Proof. Let us denote by mðmÞ the Mo¨bius function. Recall that mð1Þ ¼ 1,
mðmÞ ¼ 0 if m is not square free, and mðmÞ ¼ ð1ÞnðmÞ otherwise, where nðmÞ
is the number of prime divisors of m52. From the inclusion–exclusion
principle (see also [13, Chap. 2, Theorem 2.1]), we see that
Nn;kðMÞ ¼
X
mjjðMÞ
mðmÞTn;kðmÞ;
where Tn;kðmÞ is the number of e 2 ½1; 2n  1 with exactly k non-zero binary
digits and such that e  0 ðmod mÞ. If m is odd, it is easily seen that
Tn;kð2mÞ ¼ Tn1;kðmÞ and mð2mÞ ¼ mðmÞ; consequently,
Nn;kðMÞ ¼
X
mjjðMÞ
m odd
mðmÞðTn;kðmÞ  Tn1;kðmÞÞ ¼
X
mjjðMÞ
m odd
mðmÞT *n;kðmÞ; ð2Þ
where T *n;kðmÞ is the number of e 2 ½2n1; 2n  1 with exactly k non-zero
binary digits and such that e  0 ðmod mÞ.
By Theorem 2 of Mauduit and Sa´rko¨zy [11], there exist absolute constants
c1; c2 > 0 such that
Tn;kðmÞ ¼ 1
m
n
k
 !
ð1þ Oðexpðc1k=log mÞÞÞ
uniformly for m4K , where K ¼ expðc2k1=2Þ. For any such m, we have
T *n;kðmÞ ¼
1
m
n  1
k  1
 !
ð1þ Oðexpðc1k=log mÞÞÞ: ð3Þ
To estimate T *n;kðmÞ for larger values of m, we remark that if m lies in the
range 2s4m42sþ1  1 and if mje, then those bits of e in the right most s
positions are uniquely determined by the bits in the left most n  s positions.
Since the ﬁrst bit of e is 1, we have
T *n;kðmÞ4
Xk1
j¼0
n  1 s
j
 !
:
NUMBER OF SPARSE RSA EXPONENTS 343For any integer s50, we have the bound
T *n;kðmÞ42n1s52n=m: ð4Þ
If 2k4n  s þ 1, we have a better estimate
T *n;kðmÞ4k
n  1 s
k  1
 !
:
Because 1 z4expðzÞ for any z50, we obtain
n  1 s  j
n  1 j 4expðs=ðn  1 s  jÞÞ4expðs=ðn  1ÞÞ
for j ¼ 0; . . . ; k  2. Therefore,
n  1 s
k  1
 !
4
n  1
k  1
 !
expðsðk  1Þ=ðn  1ÞÞ:
Using this inequality and deﬁning
W ¼ k  1ðn  1Þ ln 2 ;
we obtain
T *n;kðmÞ4k
n  1
k  1
 !
2sW4k
n  1
k  1
 !
2WmW42k
n  1
k  1
 !
mW: ð5Þ
Note that W51 since 2ðk  1Þ4ðn  1Þ.
Now we consider two separate cases. First, suppose that K52n2kþ1, and
put L ¼ 2n2kþ1. We use the bound (3) for m4K , the bound (5) for
K5m4L, and the bound (4) for m > L. Therefore, from (2) we derive
Nn;kðMÞ ¼
n  1
k  1
 ! X
mjjðMÞ
m4K
m odd
mðmÞ
m
þ O n  1
k  1
 ! X
mjjðMÞ
m4K
m odd
expðc1k=log mÞ
0
BBBB@
þ k n  1
k  1
 ! X
mjjðMÞ
K5m4L
m odd
mW þ 2n
X
mjjðMÞ
m>L
m odd
m1
1
CCCCA:
BANKS AND SHPARLINSKI344Since W51, one can extend the ﬁrst summation to include all odd divisors of
jðMÞ with the same error term. Because jðMÞ is even we have
X
mjjðMÞ
m even
mðmÞ
m
¼
X
mjjðMÞ
m odd
mð2mÞ
2m
¼ 1
2
X
mjjðMÞ
m odd
mðmÞ
m
:
Therefore,
1
2
X
mjjðMÞ
m odd
mðmÞ
m
¼
X
mjjðMÞ
m odd
mðmÞ
m
þ
X
mjjðMÞ
m even
mðmÞ
m
¼
X
mjjðMÞ
mðmÞ
m
:
Using the well-known identity
X
mjjðMÞ
mðmÞ
m
¼ 2 jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ ;
which follows from the inclusion–exclusion principle (see also [13, Chap. 2,
Theorem 2.1]) we obtain
X
mjjðMÞ
m odd
mðmÞ
m
¼ 2 jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ :
Hence,
Nn;kðMÞ  2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ
¼ O
X
mjjðMÞ
m4K
m odd
n  1
k  1
 !
expðc1k=log mÞ
0
BBBB@
þ k n  1
k  1
 ! X
mjjðMÞ
K5m4L
m odd
mW þ 2n
X
mjjðMÞ
m>L
m odd
m1
1
CCCCA
NUMBER OF SPARSE RSA EXPONENTS 345¼ O tðjðMÞÞ n  1
k  1
 !
expðc1k=log KÞ þ k
n  1
k  1
 !
KW þ 2n=L
 ! !
¼ O tðjðMÞÞ n  1
k  1
 !
expðc1k=log KÞ þ k
n  1
k  1
 !
KW þ 22k
 ! !
;
where tðrÞ denotes the number of integer divisors of r52.
As before we have
22k24 ð2k  2Þ 2k  2
k  1
 !
4 ð2k  2Þ n  1
k  1
 !
expððn  2k þ 1Þðk  1Þ=ðn  1ÞÞ
¼ ð2k  2Þ n  1
k  1
 !
2Wðn2kþ1Þ4ð2k  2Þ n  1
k  1
 !
KW:
Therefore,
Nn;kðMÞ2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ ¼O tðjðMÞÞk
n  1
k  1
 !
expðc3k3=2n1Þ
 !
;
where c3 > 0 is an absolute constant.
Next we turn to the case K52n2kþ1. We use the bound (3) for m4K ,
and the bound (4) for m > K . Proceeding as before, we obtain in this
case
Nn;kðMÞ  2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ
¼ O
X
mjjðMÞ
m4K
m odd
n  1
k  1
 !
expðc1k=log mÞ þ 2n
X
mjjðMÞ
m>K
m odd
m1
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA
¼ O tðjðMÞÞ n  1
k  1
 !
expðc1k=log KÞ þ 2nK1
 ! !
:
BANKS AND SHPARLINSKI346It follows from Lemma 8 of MacWilliams and Sloane [10] that
n  1
k  1
 !
5ð2nÞ1=22ðn1ÞHððk1Þ=ðn1ÞÞ;
where
HðaÞ ¼ a log a ð1 aÞ logð1 aÞ; 05a51:
Note that HðaÞ is strictly increasing for 05a51
2
, as is easily veriﬁed. For
05d51
H
1 d
2
 
¼  1 d
2
log
1 d
2
 1þ d
2
log
1þ d
2
¼  1 d
2
ðlogð1 dÞ  1Þ  1þ d
2
ðlogð1þ dÞ  1Þ
¼ 1þ d
2
logð1 dÞ  d
2
logð1þ dÞ:
Taking into account that lnð1 dÞ ¼ OðdÞ we obtain
H
1 d
2
 
¼ 1þ Oðd2Þ:
From the condition on K we derive the inequality
1
2
5
k  1
n  15
1
2
 log K
2ðn  1Þ ¼
1 d
2
;
where
d ¼ log K
n  1 ¼ Oðn
1=2Þ:
Therefore,
H
k  1
n  1
 
5H
1 d
2
 
¼ 1þ Oðn1Þ:
Thus,
n  1
k  1
 !
52nþOðlog nÞ
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2nK14
n  1
k  1
 !
expðc4k1=2Þ
for some absolute constant c4 > 0.
Therefore, for any k4ðn þ 1Þ=2 we have
Nn;kðMÞ  2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ ¼ O tðjðMÞÞk
n  1
k  1
 !
expðc5k3=2n1Þ
 !
for some absolute constant c5 > 0.
To complete the proof, recall that tðrsÞ4tðrÞtðsÞ for integers r; s51.
Consequently,X
M2Rn
tðjðMÞÞ4
X
M¼pl2Rn
tðp  1Þtðl  1Þ
4
X
p2P
p52n
tðp  1Þ
X
l2P
2n1=p4l52n=p
tðl  1Þ:
From [13, Theorem 7.1] we haveX
l4L
l2P
tðl  1Þ ¼ OðLÞ:
Hence,
X
M2Rn
tðjðMÞÞ ¼O 2n
X
p52n
p2P
tðp  1Þ
p
0
BB@
1
CCA
¼O 2n
Xn
j¼1
2j
X
2j14p52j
p2P
tðp  1Þ
0
BB@
1
CCA ¼ Oð2nnÞ:
Thus,
X
M2Rn
Nn;kðMÞ  2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ


¼ O kn2n n  1
k  1
 !
expðc5k3=2n1Þ
 !
:
BANKS AND SHPARLINSKI348From the prime number theorem, one easily derives that jRnj5c62nn2 for
some absolute constant c6 > 0, and the result follows. ]
In particular, we see that for any 1
3
> e > 0 and k 
 n2=3þe the bound
Nn;kðMÞ ¼ 2
n  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ ð1þ Oðexpðn
eÞÞÞ
holds for almost all M 2 Rn.
3. REMARKS
Let t; s be non-zero integers and n ¼ st. We think of the binary
representation of an n bit number as a sequence of t blocks of s bits each.
LetNn;k;tðMÞ be the set of e 2 ½1; 2n  1 with exactly k non-zero bit blocks
and such that gcdðe;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1. Let Nn;k;tðMÞ denote the cardinality of
Nn;k;tðMÞ. Is it true that
Nn;k;tðMÞ 
 2sð2s  1Þk1
t  1
k  1
 !
jðjðMÞÞ
jðMÞ ;
when M runs through the set of RSA moduli M ¼ pl, where p and l are two
primes?
Note that the case s ¼ 1 reduces to what has already been shown. The
motivation for the problem comes from the fact that in order to speed-up
exponentiation one sometimes uses the window method (see [12, Algorithm
14.82]). Here, rather than ‘‘sparse’’ RSA exponents one is interested in using
‘‘block sparse’’ RSA exponents.
It is known [1–3, 14, 15] that if some information about the bits of the
decryption exponent d is available then the corresponding encryption is
vulnerable to various attacks. Thus, it will be very important to show that
the set of d deﬁned by (1) for e 2Nn;kðMÞ is uniformly distributed modulo
jðMÞ. Although, we hope that the method of Friedlander and Shparlinski
[6] combined with the Hua Loo Keng method of estimating of exponential
sums can be applied to this problem, so far there have been several obstacles
that we have not been able to overcome.
On the other hand, there does exist a slightly diﬀerent set of encryption
exponents that also admit fast modular exponentiation (because they are
small) and for which the corresponding set of decryption exponents can be
shown to be uniformly distributed. The result is based on a recent estimate
of a double exponential sum from [7–9]; see also [5]. To be more speciﬁc, it
follows from [7, Theorem 2] than for any e > 0, there exists a constant
NUMBER OF SPARSE RSA EXPONENTS 349cðeÞ > 0 that for
X ¼ expðcðeÞðlog MÞ2=3þeÞ
j k
the inverses modulo jðMÞ of the elements
E ¼ fe ¼ pl : p; l 2 P; X4p5l42X ; gcdðpl;jðMÞÞ ¼ 1g
are uniformly distributed modulo jðMÞ. For any e 2 E, the exponentiation
xe  ðxpÞl ðmod MÞ requires only Oððlog MÞ2=3þeÞ modular multiplications,
which is much smaller than what is required for a general exponent. On the
other hand, since the corresponding decryption exponents are uniformly
distributed, it is very unlikely that they will possess any special proper-
ties that make them vulnerable to attacks similar to those described in
[1–3, 14, 15].
Finally, it is easy to derive from [4, Theorem 3.1] that for all integer
M 2 ½2n1; 2n  1, except maybe oð2nÞ of them the bound
tðjðMÞÞ42ð0:5þoð1ÞÞ ln2 ln M
holds. Using this bound one can show that Nn;kðMÞ is close to its expected
value for almost all integer M 2 ½2n1; 2n  1 (rather than just for almost all
M 2 Rn).
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